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Abstract: For a class of n-player (n ≥ 2) sequential bargaining games with probabilistic
recognition and general agreement rules, we characterize pure strategy Stationary Subgame Perfect
(PSSP) equilibria via a ﬁnite number of equalities and inequalities. We use this characterization
and the degree theory of Shannon, 1994, to show that when utility over agreements has negative
deﬁnite second (contingent) derivative, there is a ﬁnite number of PSSP equilibrium points for
almost all discount factors. If in addition the space of agreements is one-dimensional, the theo-
rem applies for all SSP equilibria. And for oligarchic voting rules (which include unanimity) with
agreement spaces of arbitrary ﬁnite dimension, the number of SSP equilibria is odd and the equi-
librium correspondence is lower-hemicontinuous for almost all discount factors. Finally, we provide
as u ﬃcient condition for uniqueness of SSP equilibrium in oligarchic games.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Sequential bargaining models of complete information starting with Rubinstein, 1982, have
provided a fruitful environment for the study of the resolution of disagreements among agents.
Unlike cooperative formulations which are silent about the underlying actions of bargaining parties,
these games juxtapose equilibrium conditions based on a scrutiny of the optimality of individual
choices via which proposals emerge and agreements are crafted. In typical situations, (reﬁned)
equilibria of these games exist allowing applications to numerous areas of social interaction. In
legislative or other political environments where the non-existence of equilibrium of the cooperative
genre is pervasive, such models have been welcomed in celebratory spirits.
Our goal in this paper is to study the structure of the set of equilibria for an important class
of these bargaining games and analyze their stability to perturbations of the model. By stability
in what follows we mean the property that the number of equilibria of these games is ﬁnite and
each equilibrium is locally expressible as a continuous function of model parameters. Then, a slight
change in the bargaining environment results in small changes in equilibrium behavior. Importantly,
if we calculate equilibria using parameter values that do not exactly coincide with their true values,
t h ee q u i l i b r i aw eo b t a i na r es t i l lc l o s et ot h et r u ee q u i l i b r i a .
Besides its obvious epistemological signiﬁcance, such a property seems essential in order to
build richer models of political interaction. In parliamentary systems, for example, government
formation following elections requires us to append a bargaining model at the end of a game
preceded by an electoral stage. In these situations, it is important to ensure conditions such that
changes in the bargaining environment induced at the electoral stage, induce continuous changes
in the distribution of subsequent agreements and policy outcomes.
We focus our investigation on Stationary Subgame Perfect equilibria in pure strategies (PSSP).
We allow general agreement rules, although our results are stronger for a subclass of these. We as-
sume players are recognized to make proposals with some probability ﬁxed across periods. In the
main paper we focus on the case of bargaining with discounting, although in the appendix we show
our analysis also applies in the case of ﬁxed delay costs. With varying degrees of generality, such
models have been analyzed by, for example, Binmore, 1987, Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, Harrington,
1990, Baron, 1991, Merlo and Wilson, 1995, Banks and Duggan, 2000, Jackson and Moselle, 2002,
Eraslan, 2002, Eraslan and Merlo, 2002, etc.
2Except in special cases, the behavior of SSP equilibria for these games is not fully understood.
Banks and Duggan, 2000, studied discounted games such as those we analyze and showed upper-
hemicontinuity of SSP equilibria with respect to parameters. But they also provided an example of
a majority rule game that has a continuum of PSSP and an equilibrium correspondence that fails
lower-hemicontinuity.
Stronger results arise in certain types of unanimity games. For such n-player games with
discounting, Merlo and Wilson, 1995, have shown that stationary equilibria are unique when bar-
gaining emulates the division of a possibly stochastic cake and a contraction condition is met. Thus,
for the subset of games in Merlo and Wilson for which the upper-hemicontinuity result of Banks
and Duggan holds, the equilibrium correspondence simply becomes a continuous function of the
parameters.
But collective bargaining will often not emulate the division of a cake, due to the public goods
aspect of agreements or the ideological nature of disagreements. For such an ideological space, in
section 3 of this paper we provide an example of a four-player discounted unanimity game that
admits a continuum of PSSP equilibria.2
In view of the above, at most we can hope to show that this type of pathological behavior of
the equilibrium set is not generic. Binmore, 1987, showed this is so in Rubinstein’s two player game
with delay costs, but we know of no general arguments to that eﬀect. Our theorem specializes in
three versions of decreasing strength which guarantee that, for almost all discount factors:( a )w h e n
the agreement rule is oligarchic, a class that includes unanimity rule, the number of SSP equilibria is
odd and equilibrium correspondence is lower-hemicontinuous. (b) If the space of agreements is one-
dimensional, then all SSP equilibria are locally unique and ﬁnite in number for general agreement
rules. Finally, (c) for non-oligarchic rules in multidimensional agreement spaces there is a ﬁnite
number (possibly zero) of PSSP equilibria.
Our results are weaker in the last case since PSSP equilibria may not exist in these games.
Still, this theorem has been used in a majority rule application in Kalandrakis, 2003, to show
that minority governments in parliamentary government formation bargaining almost always occur
2The situation is less encouraging in the case of ﬁxed delay costs. From Rubinstein’s original paper a continuum
of PSSP can emerge in such games even in the two-player unanimity case, even though SSP (and mere Subgame
Perfect) equilibrium is unique in the discounted version. Rubinstein’s game involves alternating oﬀers, but the same
holds for the probabilistic recognition rules we consider.
3with positive probability when utility from cabinet positions is small relative to the ideological
disagreements of political parties.
Before we move to the formal arguments, we tie our analysis to two strands of related lit-
erature oﬀering a guide to the arguments that permitted our results. The ﬁrst literature sprung
from the study of general equilibrium economies and was pioneered by, Debreu, 1970. There is
also a related game-theoretic literature starting with, Harsanyi, 1973, who provided an alternative
p r o o fo ft h ef a c tt h a ta l m o s ta l lﬁnite games in normal form have an odd number of Nash equi-
libria. Similarly, Kreps and Wilson, 1982, showed that the equilibrium outcome distributions of
ﬁnite games in the extensive form are ﬁnite in number. The same was shown true for a class of
cheap talk games by In-Uck Park, 1997. Haller and Lagunoﬀ, 2000, showed genericity of behavior
in Markovian equilibria of dynamic games with ﬁnite action and state spaces.
When it comes to games with continuous action spaces, Dubey, 1986, oﬀered a general result
for simultaneous move games. The bargaining games we analyze involve both a continuous action
space for the proposer as well as multi-period dynamic interaction. Thus, these games are not
covered by any existing studies. Yet, due to their particular structure, these games are amenable
to similar techniques. A key insight is that the proposer in each period chooses among a ﬁnite
number only of winning coalitions, even though she has to propose from a continuum of agreements.
Exploiting this fact, our proof strategy proceeds as follows.
First, we introduce the notion of an agenda setting plan corresponding to a player/proposer
and a winning coalition: it is a mapping from the possible reservation values of players to optimal
proposals by the proposer that are acceptable by members of the coalition. The role of agenda
setting plans in our analysis is very akin to that of demand functions in the study of economic
equilibrium. Much like demand functions shift the focus from the consumers’ optimization problem
to reduce economic equilibrium to a set of equations that ensure that markets clear, agenda setting
plans sidestep the proposer’s optimization problem and reduce equilibrium to a set of equations
that ensure that players’ coalition choices produce reservation values that are consistent with these
choices.3
PSSP equilibria emerge when each proposer chooses a unique coalition. Since there is a ﬁnite
3Kalandrakis, n.d., has used similar arguments to provide a proof of existence of SSP equilibria via Brouwer’s
theorem.
4number of possible combinations of coalition choices by the players, we ensure that every PSSP can
be expressed as the solution to one among a ﬁnite number of systems of equations. Thence, our
result only requires that each of these systems of equations has ﬁnitely many solutions.
Because they involve solutions to optimization problems (the agenda setting plans) our equi-
librium equations are not suﬃciently smooth to allow us to apply Sard’s theorem (or the transver-
sality theorem). In the theory of general economic equilibrium this problem has been confronted
early on by Rader, 1973, who was able to extend Debreu’s 1970 results to cases when the demand
functions are not diﬀerentiable but satisfy certain stability properties. More recently, Shannon,
1994, developed a degree theory for non-smooth equations. As an application, she strengthened
Rader’s work to a conclusion similar to Dierker’s, 1972. Our theorem is derived by applying ho-
motopy arguments based on the degree theory of Shannon, 1994, and using a theorem of Rader,
1973.
We have organized our analysis in the remainder as follows. In section 2 we present the
bargaining model analyzed. In section 3, we provide an example of a unanimity game that admits
a continuum of PSSP equilibria. Our analysis culminates in section 4 where we show that the
example in section 3 is not generic in the space of discount factors. We conclude in section 5.
2. MODEL
Consider a set of n ≥ 2 players N = {1,...,n}. They convene in periods t =1 ,2,...to reach
an agreement x drawn from a set X. We assume X a convex, compact subset of Rd, d ≥ 1.M u c ho f
related literature sidesteps the underlying space of agreements X to work with the space of payoﬀs
generated from X. We will eventually resort to similar arguments, but we ﬁnd it enlightening to
build from the primitives of the model.
An agreement requires the approval of a winning coalition, C ⊆ N. The set of winning
coalitions is determined by the underlying voting rule and is denoted by D ⊂ 2N\∅, D 6= ∅.F o r
example, if all players have one vote and the voting rule is simple majority, D consists of all
coalitions with more than n
2 members.
Our strongest results concern the class of oligarchic rules. Voting rule D is oligarchic if there
exists coalition Co ∈ D such that Co =
T
C∈D C. One important member of the class of oligarchic
rules is unanimity,w h e nD = {N} and Co = N. Since some of our basic arguments aﬀord greater
5generality, we admit a much wider class of agreement rules. Hence, as in Banks and Duggan, 2000,
the only restriction on D is monotonicity: for any two coalitions A, B with A ⊆ B ⊆ N,w eh a v e
A ∈ D =⇒ B ∈ D.
Players bargain as follows. In each period t =1 ,2,..., one of the players is chosen by nature
(or ‘recognized’ in legislative language) to make a proposal z ∈ X. Having observed the proposal,
players vote yes or no. If a winning coalition vote yes, then the game ends with z being implemented.
Otherwise, the game moves to the next period, a player is recognized anew to make a proposal,
and so on until an agreement is reached. The probability that player i ∈ N is recognized to make
a proposal is constant across periods and equal to πi ≥ 0. Obviously
P
i∈N πi =1 .
Legislator i ∈ N derives von Neuman-Morgenstern stage utility ui : X −→ R from the
agreement x. We assume throughout that ui is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave, and that
the agreements are desirable so that ui (x) > 0, for all x ∈ X,a l li ∈ N. Our analysis will require
additional assumptions on ui, i ∈ N, which we state in the sequel as necessary.
Players discount the future by a factor δi ∈ (0,1), i ∈ N.T h u s ,t h ep a y o ﬀ of player i from a
decision x ∈ X reached in period t ≥ 1 is given by δt−1
i ui (x), and it is zero in the case of perpetual
disagreement. We denote the vector of discount factors for players i =1 ,...,nby δ =( δ1,...,δn) ∈ D,
where D ≡ (0,1)
n. Highlighting the fact that our genericity results are cast in terms of discounting
parameters δ,w ed e n o t es p e c i ﬁc games by Γδ. In the appendix we discuss how our arguments
extend naturally to the case players incur a delay cost ci ∈ R++, i ∈ N instead of discounting the
future.
We shall focus our attention to pure strategy stationary subgame perfect (PSSP) equilibria.
A pure stationary proposal strategy for player i ∈ N is an agreement zi ∈ X proposed when i is
recognized. A stationary voting strategy for player i is speciﬁed by an acceptance set Ai ⊆ X.
Ai is the set of proposals on which player i votes yes. A stationary strategy for player i is a pair
σi =( zi,A i) that consists of a proposal strategy and an acceptance set.
Given stationary strategies σi =( zi,A i), we calculate players’ continuation value, vi, i ∈ N,
which is deﬁned as the expected utility if the game moves in the next period. Using the continuation
value, we deﬁne the reservation value of player i as:
Deﬁnition 1 The reservation value of player i, i ∈ N,f o rc o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u evi is given by
ri ≡ δivi.
6In general, it is necessary to restrict voting strategies in order to rule out implausible equi-
libria in which winning coalitions approve undesirable proposals or reject desirable proposals solely
because each of the players is not pivotal and hence is indiﬀerent between her voting actions. In
eﬀect, we require that for reservation values r ∈ Rn, voting strategies satisfy:
x ∈Ai ⇐⇒ ui (x) ≥ ri, i ∈ N (1)
i.e. players approve proposals if and only if they weakly prefer them over their reservation value.
Following Baron and Kalai, 1993, we call such voting strategies stage-undominated.
A PSSP equilibrium in stage-undominated voting strategies is an n-tuple of stationary strate-
gies σi,i∈ N such that Ai are stage undominated given the corresponding reservation values, and
players are sequentially rational. It can be shown (see Banks and Duggan, 2000) that all SSP equi-
libria in the class of games we consider involve no delay, i.e. all equilibrium proposals are approved
given equilibrium voting strategies. In what follows we shall omit reference to the reﬁnement on
voting strategies and the no-delay property of equilibria for compactness. Thus, a PSSP equilibrium
will be taken to imply the use of stage-undominated voting strategies and involve no delay.
3. AN EXAMPLE WITH A CONTINUUM OF PSSP
In this section we shall provide an example of a game satisfying our assumptions that has
a continuum of PSSP equilibria. It involves four players bargaining under unanimity rule over
agreements drawn from a one-dimensional policy space. This example illustrates the gap between
the conditions that ensure uniqueness of equilibrium in the unanimity games of Merlo and Wilson,
1995, and agreement spaces typical in political environments.
[insert ﬁgure 1 about here]










, N = {1,2,3,4}, D = {N}, πi = 1
4,
i ∈ N, δi = 1
5, i =1 ,4, δi = 4
5, i =2 ,3, and the following utility functions over x ∈ X:
u1 (x)=−x2 − 3x +1 0 ,a n d
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7Also u4 (x)=u1 (−x) and u3 (x)=u2 (−x). Notice that ui,i=1 ,2,3,4 are strictly concave and in
fact C1 and that ui > 0,f o ra l lx ∈ X.








, while player 4 proposes −α. Indeed, with these proposals, players’ reservation
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Note that we give an example with an oligarchic voting rule, but this example can be modiﬁed
to obtain a continuum of equilibria with non-oligarchic rules, such as majority rule. Also the
example admits a number of other modiﬁcations, such as a ﬁfth player with a ‘bliss’ point at
zero (the median), additional policy dimensions, etc. The key to the result is that the balanced
contraction of the two extreme equilibrium proposals (α and −α) produces a net change in the
reservation values of players 2 and 3 that is exactly equal to the change in utility from the one of
these two proposals that renders each player exactly indiﬀerent.
For this to occur under unanimity in the presence of discounting, utility must change at a
much faster rate at the agreement which these players strictly approve as shown in Figure 1. Clearly,
if players 2 and 3 are strictly indiﬀerent between both proposals α and −α,s u c hd i ﬀerential rate
of change in utilities is not possible without destroying the feasibility of one of the two proposals.
Thus, this type of multiplicity of equilibrium points cannot emerge under the conditions that
ensure uniqueness of equilibrium in Merlo and Wilson, 1995. In their analysis, the assumption
that bargaining amounts to the division of a (stochastic) cake and a contraction condition ensure
that players other than the proposer receive exactly their reservation value under all equilibrium
agreements.
In the next section we shall show that the pathological behavior of the equilibrium set in
the above example can occur for at most a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of discount
8factors.
4. GENERIC REGULARITY
We have divided this section into four subsections. We start with subsection (i), in which we
oﬀer a characterization of PSSP equilibria. The advantage of this characterization is that it reduces
the expression of equilibrium to a ﬁnite number of equalities and inequalities. In subsection (ii), we
use this characterization in order to apply the degree theory for non-smooth equations developed by
Shannon, 1994, on a weaker notion of equilibrium that ignores the inequalities among equilibrium
conditions. We deﬁne regular games Γδ, and develop an index theory for the PSSP equilibria of
regular games. In subsection (iii), we establish suﬃcient conditions on players’ utilities that ensure
that almost all such games are regular. We conclude this section in subsection (iv), where we
provide a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness of PSSP equilibrium in oligarchic games.
i. Agenda Setting Plans and PSSP
In order to state our characterization of PSSP equilibria, we introduce some necessary con-
cepts and notation. First, we construct a space of possible continuation values by considering all
possible lotteries over proposals that may prevail in period t +1if delay occurs in period t.L e t
P [X] be the set of Borel probability measures over X. We obtain the space of possible continuation
values, V , as the image v(P [X]) of the mapping v : P [X] −→ Rn,w h e r evi (µ) ≡
R
X ui (x)µ(dx),
µ ∈ P [X].4
Next we deﬁne the set of reservation values for game Γδ.W ed e n o t et h i ss e tb yRδ,s i n c ei t
depends on discount factors δ ∈ D by the deﬁnition of the reservation values ri ≡ δivi.T h u sw e
have:
Rδ ≡ {x ∈ Rn : xi = δivi,a l li ∈ N,a l lv ∈ V }
We also deﬁne a set R ⊂ Rn that contains all possible reservation values for all possible discount




4Even though we focus on pure proposal strategies, the need to consider lotteries over proposals arises from the
fact that proposers are chosen probabilistically.
9Next consider the subset of winning coalitions that include player i and are minimum winning
in the sense that if any player j 6= i is removed from the coalition, the coalition ceases to be a winning
coalition. Denote this set of coalitions by Ξi ⊂ D, more formally deﬁned as5
Ξi ≡ {C ∈ D : i ∈ C and C \{ j} / ∈ D,∀j ∈ C,j 6= i}
Let the number of coalitions in Ξi beξi ≡ |Ξi|. By non-emptiness and monotonicity of the agreement
rule, D, we are guaranteed that ξi ≥ 1, for all ∈ N. In what follows we index the elements of Ξi,
Cω ∈ Ξi,b yω =1 ,...,ξi.
We now introduce the concept of an agenda setting plan. Roughly speaking, an agenda setting
plan speciﬁes optimal agreements for the proposer that meet the approval of a particular winning
coalition for all possible reservation values that members in that coalition may have. We denote
the agenda setting plan of proposer i and coalition Cω ∈ Ξi by fi
ω. Formally it is a correspondence
fi
ω : R ⇒ X,g i v e nb y
fi
ω (r) ≡ argmax
x {ui (x):uj (x) ≥ rj,j∈ Cω}.
The signiﬁcance of agenda setting plans becomes obvious from the following lemma:






















that are acceptable by any coalition C ∈ D such that C/ ∈ Ξi are also acceptable by some
coalition Cω ∈ Ξi,s ot h a ty ∈fi
ω (r).S i n c ey is optimal, ui (y) ≥ ui (x) ≥ ri, for all x ∈
Sξi
ω=1 fi
ω (r). By the monotonicity of the agreement rule C
S
{i} ∈ D and there exists Cω ⊆
C
S
{i} such that Cω ∈ Ξi, by the deﬁnition of Ξi.T h u s , y ∈
T
h∈Cω Ah hence y ∈fi










In general, an agenda setting plan fi
ω is a multi-valued correspondence. But in certain modal
cases, as we establish in lemma 3 at the end of subsection (iii), agenda setting plans fi
ω are functions.
In those cases, we can characterize PSSP equilibria by representing the proposal strategy of player
5Note that coalitions in Ξi need not be minimum winning in the traditional sense since for coalition C ∈ Ξi it
may be that C \{ i} ∈ D, i.e. the coalition is still winning when the proposer is removed.
10i ∈ N as a choice of coalition from Ξi for given reservation values, instead of a choice of agreement
from X.L e tΩ ≡ {1,...,ξi}× n
i=1,s ot h a tω ∈ Ω represents a choice of coalition from Ξi by each of
the n players i ∈ N.W eh a v e :
Theorem 1 Consider game Γδ for which fi





i=1 are a PSSP equilibrium of game Γδ i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ee x i s t sav e c t o ro fc o a l i t i o n
choices ω ∈ Ω and a vector of reservation values r∗ ∈ Rδ, such that z∗
i = fi





















, for all ω0 =1 ,...,ξi, i ∈ N (4)




i=1 form a PSSP equilibrium. We shall show there
exist ω ∈ Ω, r∗ ∈ Rδ such that z∗
i = fi
ωi (r∗), i ∈ N, and (3) and (4) hold. Construct the reservation






i), for all i ∈ N.
For these reservation values r∗, we now obtain voting strategies A0







































,f o ra l lω =1 ,...,ξi,a l li ∈ N.S e tω =( ω∗
1,...,ω∗
n),a n dt h i s
part of the proof is complete.





i=1 by setting z0
i = fi
ωi (r∗) and A0
i = {x ∈ X : ui (x) ≥ r∗





















i=1 do not admit proﬁtable one
period deviations and constitute a PSSP equilibrium by the one-stage deviation principle.
11The characterization in theorem 1 allows us to study the PSSP equilibrium set by applying
homotopy arguments on the n equations determined by (3). For that purpose we deﬁne a weaker
notion of equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 2 Consider game Γδ for which fi
ω is a function for all i ∈ N, ω =1 ,...,ξi. A pseudo-











, for all i ∈ N. (5)
Clearly, from theorem 1 and deﬁnition 2, genuine no-delay equilibria diﬀer from pseudo-PSSP
in that the latter do not necessarily satisfy the inequalities in (4). Thus, every PSSP equilibrium
is a pseudo-PSSP equilibrium but not vice-versa. In the special case of oligarchic games, we have
ξi =1 ,i∈ N, hence Ω is a singleton and pseudo-PSSP and PSSP equilibria coincide.
ii. Regular Games
Our analysis has permitted the expression of (pseudo)equilibria as solutions to systems of
equations. In this subsection we shall use this formulation to study the behavior of (pseudo)PSSP
equilibria of game Γδ and derive an index theory for the equilibrium set.
Deﬁne the set of solutions to equations (5) for given ω ∈ Ω by Eω
δ ≡ {r ∈ Rδ:( 5 )h o l d s }.
Next, assuming fi
ω is a function for all i ∈ N, ω =1 ,...,ξi,d e ﬁne for each ω ∈ Ω the mapping








¢, i =1 ,..,n
Clearly r ∈ Eω
δ if and only if Gω (r)=δ.
Following Rader, 1973, and Shannon, 1994, we say that y ∈ Y is a regular value of the
function g : X −→ Y if both Dg(x) exists and is non-singular for all x ∈ X such that g(x)=y.
We say that y ∈ Y is a critical value if it is not a regular value. We can show the following:
Lemma 2 Consider game Γδ and assume fi
ω a continuous function for all i ∈ N, ω =1 ,...,ξi.I f
δ ∈ D is a regular value of Gω,f o rs o m eω ∈ Ω,t h e n
(i) |Eω
δ | < +∞, is an odd number, and










δ is lower-hemicontinuous at δ.
Proof. Let ∂R denote the boundary of R.7 We claim ﬁrst that:
Claim: For each δ ∈ D, Rδ
T
∂R = ∅. Since Rδ ⊆ R,i ts u ﬃces to show that R is an
open set. To see that R is open, notice that R can also be expressed as the union
S
v∈V Rv of the
product sets Rv ≡ D{v}, v ∈ V .C l e a r l y ,Rv =( 0 ,v i)×n
i=1, and since vi > 0 for all v ∈ V , i ∈ N,
Rv is open. Hence, R is open as the union of open sets.
Now deﬁne G1 : R −→ Rn as G1 (r) ≡ Gω (r)−δ.S i n c eX is compact and ui continuous, ui ≡
min
x∈X




− δi, i =1 ,...,n.
Consider the continuous function Ht =( 1− t)G0 + tG1.L e tH−1
t (0) ≡ {r ∈ R : Ht (r)=0}.I n
order to apply homotopy arguments, we wish to show that H−1
t (0)
T
∂R = ∅ for all t ∈ [0,1].
For r ∈H−1












































≥ui for all i ∈ N, hence we have δ0
i ∈ (0,δi] for all i ∈ N and
all t ∈ [0,1]. Then, δ0 ∈ D and we have r ∈Rδ0.B u tRδ0
T
∂R = ∅, by the claim. Hence, for all
t ∈ [0,1] and all r ∈H−1
t (0),w eh a v er / ∈∂R.
Note that, since δ is a regular value of Gω and by theorem 10, page 159, in Shannon, 1994,
the degree of Gω is given by d(Gω,R,δ) ≡
P
r∈Eω


















Since R is a bounded set, we have proven (i): Gω has an odd, ﬁnite number (at least one) of
solutions.
To show (ii) notice that, since δ is a regular value, for every rl∈Eω
δ , l =1 ,...,|Eω
δ | there exists
an e i g h b o r h o o do frl, Nl ⊂ R, such that Eω
δ
T
Nl = {rl} (e.g. Shannon, 1994, theorem 1, page
150). Then, since δ / ∈Gω (∂Nl),t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that |δ − d| >εfor all d ∈ Gω (∂Nl).N o w
the degree is constant, i.e. d
¡
Gω,N l,δ0¢
= d(Gω,N l,δ) for every δ0 ∈ Bε (δ),w h e r eBε (δ) is the
ε-ball around δ. By theorem 9 of Shannon, 1994, page 158, d(Gω,N l,δ)=signdetDGω (rl).B u t
signdetDGω (rl) 6=0since δ is a regular value. Thus d
¡
Gω,N l,δ0¢
6=0for every δ0 ∈ Bε (δ), i.e.
for every δ0 ∈ Bε (δ) there exists r0 ∈ Nl such that r0 ∈ Eω
δ0. This establishes lower-hemicontinuity.
7Substantively, the boundary of R is obtained by considering values of the discount factors δi =1or δi =0 .D u e
to the concavity of ui, we can certainly extend the deﬁnition of continuous functions f
i
ω, hence G
ω to the domain R,
instead of R.
13Note that lemma 2 also constitutes a proof of existence of pseudo-PSSP for all ω ∈ Ω.A sa
consequence, it also provides a proof of existence of PSSP for oligarchic games when ξi =1for all
i ∈ N. We will say that the bargaining game Γδ is regular if δ is a regular value of Gω, for every
ω ∈ Ω.
We can summarize the implications of our analysis for regular games Γδ as follows:
Theorem 2 Consider a regular game Γδ.T h e n
(i) Γδ has a ﬁnite number of PSSP equilibria (possibly zero),
(ii) If X ⊂ R1, Γδ has a ﬁnite number (at least one) of SSP equilibria, all in pure strategies,
and
(iii) if the voting rule D, is oligarchic, Γδ has an odd number of SSP equilibria and the
equilibrium correspondence is lower-hemicontinuous at δ.
Proof. Since Ω is a ﬁnite set, part (i) follows directly from lemma 2.
To show part (ii), we shall show that all SSP equilibria of game Γδ when X ⊂ R1 are PSSP
equilibria.8 If this is true, the result follows from part (i) since SSP equilibria for these games
exist (Banks and Duggan, 2000, theorem 1). Suppose Γδ has a no-delay SSP equilibrium in mixed
strategies to get a contradiction. Let r ∈ Rδ be players’ reservation values for this equilibrium. The
voting strategies A∗
















h for every C ∈ D. By (2), there exists some player i that mixes between distinct
agreements fi
ω (r) <f i













and ui is concave, we have






. Thus, at least one of the two agenda setting plans is a
multivalued correspondence, a contradiction.
Lastly, to show part (iii) notice that by (2) and the fact that ξi =1for all i ∈ N, for every
reservation values r ∈ Rδ there exists a unique optimal agreement for each player. Thus, all SSP
equilibria are PSSP equilibria, and the latter coincide with the pseudo-PSSP equilibria of the game.
8The argument here is identical to the argument in theorem 2, part (ii) of Banks and Duggan, 2000, who assume
strictly quasi-concave utilities. Mere concavity suﬃces in our case because of the added assumption that agenda
setting plans are functions.
14The theorem provides a sharp description of the PSSP equilibrium set for regular games.
With some additional arguments, we could show that lower-hemicontinuity also applies in cases
(i) and (ii) of the theorem. Lower-hemicontinuity implies that PSSP equilibria of these games
can be expressed as continuous functions of the parameters in a neighborhood of δ. For discounted
oligarchic games, coupled with the upper-hemicontinuity result of Banks and Duggan, 2000, theorem
2 provides a complete description of the equilibrium correspondence. In eﬀect, we have shown that
regular games Γδ with oligarchic rules are essential (Fort, 1950, Wu and Jiang, 1962) with respect
to the SSP equilibrium set.
iii. Suﬃcient Conditions for Generic Regularity
The obvious next step is to inquire how prevalent are regular games Γδ in the space of discount
factors D? From the example in section 3 we cannot rule out the existence of critical values of the
maps Gω. Thus, at most we can hope to show that almost all games Γδ are regular. Assuming Gω
is diﬀerentiable, we could proceed to show that the set of critical values of Gω is of measure zero
using Sard’s theorem. But the smoothness of Gω depends on the behavior of agenda setting plans,
fi
ω. Since the latter are solutions to constrained optimization problems, they will typically not be
diﬀerentiable due to changes in the set of binding constraints (or due to the non-smoothness of ui,
i ∈ N).
In the context of general equilibrium theory, this problem is analogous to the situation when
the excess demand function is not diﬀerentiable (e.g. Katzner, 1968). To deal with the luck of
smoothness of demand functions in that context, Rader, 1973, using a result by Sard, 1958, estab-
lished the following:
Theorem 3 (Rader, 1973) Consider E ⊂ Rn,a n df : E −→ Rn that is a.e. diﬀerentiable and
maps sets of measure zero into sets of measure zero. Then, the set of critical values of f has
measure zero.
Functions that are a.e. diﬀerentiable and map sets of measure zero into sets of measure
zero include Lipschitz and locally Lipschitz functions (see Federer, 1969). Rader, 1973, (lemma 3,
page 918) showed that these requirements are also met by functions that are pointwise Lipschitz
at every point in an open domain. The pointwise Lipschitz property is a stability to perturbations
15property also known as calmness or local upper Lipschitz property in the mathematical optimization
literature. It is weaker than (local) Lipschitz continuity in that one of the two points of comparison
is held ﬁxed:
Deﬁnition 3 Af u n c t i o nf : X −→ Y is pointwise Lipschitz at x ∈ X if there exists m and a
neighborhood N (x) such that |f (x) − f (z)| ≤ m|x − z| for all z ∈ N (x).
Thus we can state suﬃcient conditions for almost all games Γδ to be regular by imposing
conditions on the agenda setting plans fi
ω. In particular:
Theorem 4 Assume fi
ω is a pointwise Lipshcitz function at every r ∈ R, for all i ∈ N, ω =1 ,...,ξi.
Then, for almost all δ ∈ D game Γδ is regular.
Proof. By theorem 3, it will suﬃce to show that Gω is pointwise Lipschitz for all ω ∈ Ω.
This is because then the set of critical values of Gω has measure zero and Ω is a ﬁnite set. Since
the ﬁnite union of sets of measure zero has measure zero, then Γδ is a regular game for almost all
δ ∈ D.
Since ui is C1, the composition ui ◦ fi
ω is pointwise Lipschitz for all i ∈ N and all fi
ω.







is also pointwise Lipschitz.
























|gi (r0) − gi (r)| ≤
m
gi (r)gi (r0)
|r − r0| for all r0 ∈
N (r), for some neighborhood N (r) of r,a n ds o m em>0 (since gi (r) is pointwise Lipschitz).







Lipschitz at r with modulus m0. Then, Gω (r)=
ri
gi (r)
is pointwise Lipschitz as the product of a
pointwise Lipschitz function and ri, and the proof is complete.
Since agenda setting plans typically do not form part of the description of the bargaining
games we analyze, it is important to also establish conditions on the primitives of the model,
speciﬁcally the utility functions ui, that ensure that almost all games Γδ are regular. There is a
large literature on the stability of solutions to perturbed optimization problems (e.g. Robinson,
1982, Bonnans and Shapiro, 1998, Klatte and Kummar, 1999, Levy, 2000, 2001, Klatte, 2001,
etc.) establishing conditions on the smoothness of the objective function and the constraints of the
problem (in our case ui)t h a tg u a r a n t e et h a tfi
ω is pointwise Lipschitz or calm.
16Indispensable in all existing results are (a) the Mangasarian-Fromowitz constraint qualiﬁ-
cation (MFCQ), and (b) a second order suﬃcient condition that involves generalized notions of
derivatives if ui are not twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Since introducing such concepts at this
point would detain the reader from the eminent culmination of our investigation, we shall brieﬂy
discuss these stronger results at the end of this subsection. We can now show:
Lemma 3 Assume either
(A1) ui is at least C2 with negative deﬁnite second derivative, D2ui (x) for all x ∈ X, i ∈ N,
and the Pareto set of X, P (X) ⊂ intX,o r
(A2) X = ∆n−1 and, for all i ∈ N, ui (x)=mi (xi) where mi :[ 0 ,1] −→ R,w i t hm0
i (x) > 0
and pointwise Lipschitz inverse m−1
i (x) for all x ∈ [mh (0),m h (1)].
Then, for all i ∈ N, ω =1 ,...,ξi, fi
ω : R ⇒ X is a pointwise Lipschitz function at all r ∈ R.
Proof. We start with assumption A1 ﬁrst. Recall that fi
ω solves the program:
maxui (x) s.t. (AS)
uh (x) ≥ rh, h ∈ Cω
x ∈ X
Consider the correspondence ACω : R ⇒ X deﬁned by ACω ≡ {x ∈ X : uh (x) ≥ rh,h∈ Cω}.
Concavity of ui, i ∈ N ensures ACω (r) is convex valued since it is the intersection of convex sets.
It is also non-empty for all r ∈ R, since for every measure µ ∈ P (X) that induces the continuation




≥ vi, by the concavity of ui and
t h ef a c tt h a t
R
X x(dµ) ∈ X by the convexity of X.I n f a c t , s i n c e δi < 1 for all i ∈ N,w eh a v e
vi >r i and thus ACω has non-empty interior. Since ui, i ∈ N, are continuous without “thick”
indiﬀerence contours, ACω is continuous as a correspondence. Upper-hemicontinuity of fi
ω then
follows by Berge’s theorem of the Maximum. By strict concavity of ui, i ∈ N, we have uniqueness
of the maximizer, for every r ∈ R,t h u sfi
ω is a continuous function.
To show that fi
ω is pointwise Lipschitz at r ∈ R,n o t et h a tP (X) ⊂ intX allows us to ignore
the constraint x ∈ X. For the remaining constraints in program (AS) the MFCQ amounts to Slater’s
constraint qualiﬁcation (SCQ): there exists x ∈ X such that uh (x) >r h for all h ∈ Cω.B u tw e ’ v e
already argued that ACω (r) has non-empty interior so that there exists x ∈ X such that uh (x) >r h
17for all r ∈ R. Hence, (SCQ) is satisﬁed for all r ∈ R.L e tL = ui (x)+θh
P
h∈Cω (uh (x) − rh) be
the Lagrangian of program (AS), ignoring constraint x ∈ X. The second order suﬃcient condition:
D2
xL = D2ui (x)+θh
P
h∈Cω D2uh (x) is negative deﬁnite, holds for all possible Lagrange multipliers
of program (AS), since D2ui (x) is negative deﬁnite for all i ∈ N, and since θh ≥ 0 for all h ∈ Cω.
As a result, for every r ∈ R the solution mapping fi
ω is pointwise Lipschitz by e.g. Klatte and
Kummer, 1999, corollary 5.5, page 82, (see also Levy, 1999, corollary 5.2, page 439, Levy, 2001,
proposition 3.2.1, page 21).
Now consider assumption A2. We have
Pn
i=1 m−1
i (max{mi (0),r i}) < 1, by the concavity
of ui (hence mi). Then, fi




   
   
0 if h / ∈ Cω
m−1




l (max{ml (0),r l}) if h = i
, i ∈ N, ω =1 ,...,ξi (6)
which is obviously a pointwise Lipschitz function.
Note that assumption A1 covers typical spatial models assumed in political applications,
while assumption A2 admits divide-the-dollar environments with private goods. In combination,
the two assumptions cover most applications in the literature.
We immediately have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Assume either (A1) or (A2). Then, for almost all δ ∈ D game Γδ is regular.
We have already hinted that we can weaken condition (A1). For instance, condition (A1)
does not cover example 1 in section 3, because utilities there are strictly concave and C1, but not
C2. To accommodate similar cases, we could replace (A1) with:
(A1
0) ui is C1,1,a n df o ra l lH ∈ CDu0
i, H is negative deﬁnite...,
where CDu0
i is the contingent derivative of the derivative of ui, u0
i. This alternative assumption
(for details see Klatte and Kummer, 1999, and Klatte, 2001) would also secure that fi
ω is pointwise
Lipschitz at r ∈ R.
We assumed throughout that ui is C1, and it seems doubtful whether we can further relax
this assumption in general settings. The same applies for the assumption of concavity, since it is
necessary to ensure that players do not wish to delay the game. Although we ﬁnd the assumption
18that P (X) ⊂ intX completely natural from casual observation of political interaction, it can
also be signiﬁcantly weakened. The role of this assumption is to ensure that there are no optimal
agreements at the boundary of X. If we permit such boundary optima, we can alternatively impose
smoothness conditions on the boundary of X.
iv. Uniqueness of PSSP
Lastly, in this subsection we establish suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium in
oligarchic games. We only focus on oligarchic games, since in the remaining cases the fact that there
are multiple coalition choices available to players (|Ω| > 1) creates natural possibilities for multiple
equilibria even if each combination of coalition choices ω admits a unique pseudo-equilibrium. To
illustrate our uniqueness condition, we apply it on a divide-the-dollar game with linear utilities and
recover the uniqueness result of Merlo and Wilson, 1995. Their uniqueness theorem applies for a
larger class of games and relies on a contraction mapping theorem, while ours is intimately related
to the analysis in subsection (ii).
Since the voting rule D is oligarchic, we have ξi =1and there is a single agenda setting plan
we denote by fi for each player i ∈ N. For the purposes of this subsection, we work directly with
equations (5) instead of the equivalent mapping Gω.W et h u sd e ﬁne







, i =1 ,..,n.
SSP equilibria are now obtained as the solutions to F (r) ≡ 0, and our uniqueness condition can
be stated as follows (see for example Shannon, 1994, corollary 11):
Theorem 5 If 0 is a regular value of F (r), then the oligarchic game Γδ has a unique SSP equi-
librium if detDrF (r) > (<)0for all r ∈ R.
As an application, consider a divide-the-dollar unanimity game with X = ∆n−1,a n dui (x)=





rh if h 6= i
1 −
P
h6=i rh if h = i
9We allow ui (x)=0 , which is not consequential for our arguments in this example.
19Hence, we formulate F (r) as
Fi (r) ≡ ri − δi











We now calculate the Jacobian DrF (r) as:
DrF (r)=

     

1 − δ1 + δ1π1 δ1π1 ··· δ1π1




δnπn δnπn ··· 1 − δn + δnπn

     

Via a series of elementary operations and making use of the properties of the determinant (or by
induction) we can obtain
detDrF (r)=
Yn





h6=i (1 − δh)
Hence, a suﬃcient condition for unique equilibrium is that (1 − δi) > 0 for each i ∈ N.T h i si st r u e
for each δ ∈ D. Furthermore, if we allow δi =1for only one i ∈ N,t h e nπi > 0 is also suﬃcient
for a unique equilibrium.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude with a few remarks hinting on interesting avenues for strengthening or weakening
the conclusions of our analysis under alternative assumptions. First, under the stronger condition
that the mapping Gω, is locally Lipschitz, Shannon, 1994, has shown that the equilibrium cor-
respondence is upper Lipschitzian at regular values δ. Unfortunately, as discussed by Robinson,
1982, page 218-219, solutions to rather unspectacular optimization problems may fail to be locally
Lipschitz to canonical perturbations. Thus, to deduce the property we would need stronger condi-
tions, such as the linear independence of the binding constraints at an optimum, which typically fail
in our problem. Interestingly, this last remark implies that one environment where such stronger
results may be possible is when the dimension of the policy space X is at least as large as the size
of the (largest minimum) winning coalition minus one.
Second, there is an intimate connection between the theory we have developed in this paper
and studies of the equilibrium set in the theory of general economic equilibrium. For instance,
20Kleinberg, 1980, Liang, 1993, Pascoa and Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, 1999, have weakened condi-
tions on individual utility to obtain (weaker) properties of the equilibrium set. It appears natural
that analogous results can be established in our framework.
Extending their earlier work (Banks and Duggan, 2000), Banks and Duggan, 2003, have
developed a discounted bargaining model closely related to the one we analyze that dispenses with
the assumption that agreements are desirable. In their model, a status quo remains in place until
it is replaced by a new agreement that is implemented in all subsequent periods. It is relevant to
inquire whether analogous results can be obtained for this alternative model. A stumbling block
appears to be the fact that they require a common discount factor, and our genericity result is
obtained from perturbation of these individual parameters. But our analysis only requires existence
of equilibrium for an open subset of discount factors, which may obtain in such games with general
status quo.
Perhaps the most interesting challenge, which is the subject of our current investigation, is
to extend the results of this analysis to the set of mixed strategy equilibria of non-oligarchic games
and to games with history dependent recognition probabilities. It appears inescapable that this
analysis requires perturbation with respect to a larger class of parameters of this game, such as
some form of perturbation of the stage utilities ui.
APPENDIX: THE CASE OF FIXED DELAY COSTS
In this appendix we show how our arguments extend naturally to the case players incur a
delay cost ci ∈ R++, i ∈ N. In this case, we deﬁne the reservation value ri ≡ vi − ci. Then, the
deﬁnition of agenda setting plans and the equilibrium characterization in theorem 1 hold. We can










− ri, i =1 ,..,n.
and letting G1 (r) ≡ Gω (r) − c, G0
i (υ) ≡ ui (x) − ri − ci, i =1 ,...,n,f o rs o m ex ∈ X,a n d








∂R = ∅ for all t ∈ [0,1].F o r r ∈H−1
















(1 − t)ui (x) for all i ∈ N we have v ∈ V , the space of possible continuation values. Thus we also
21have r ∈Rc ⊂ R for all t ∈ [0,1] and the rest of the proof is identical to that in lemma 2. The same
applies for theorem 2.
Now the suﬃcient conditions in subsection (iii) of section 4 apply directly to the agenda
setting plans of the game with delay costs, so that for almost all c ∈ Rn
++ the corresponding game,
Γc, is a regular game.
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Key: There exists a continuum of PSSP where players 2 and 3 propose 0, player 1 who 
prefers left-wing policies proposes α, and player 4 that prefers right-wing policies 
proposes –α. The utility of player 2 from α is exactly equal to her reservation value from 
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